(TRUNG QUỐC VÀ CHỦ NGHĨA PHÁT XÍT CỔ ĐIỂN - xem bản dịch phần dưới)
By Michael A. Ledeen
Posted: Tuesday, May 6, 2008
ARTICLES
Far Eastern Economic Review (May 2008)
Publication Date: May 1, 2008
In 2002, I speculated that China may be something we have never seen before: a mature fascist state. Recent events there, especially the mass rage in response to Western criticism, seem to confirm that theory. More significantly, over the intervening six years China's leaders have consolidated their hold on the organs of control--political, economic and cultural. Instead of gradually embracing pluralism as many expected, China's corporatist elite has become even more entrenched.
Even though they still call themselves communists, and the Communist Party rules the country, classical fascism should be the starting point for our efforts to understand the People's Republic. Imagine Italy 50 years after the fascist revolution. Mussolini would be dead and buried, the corporate state would be largely intact, the party would be firmly in control, and Italy would be governed by professional politicians, part of a corrupt elite, rather than the true believers who had marched on Rome. It would no longer be a system based on charisma, but would instead rest almost entirely on political repression, the leaders would be businesslike and cynical, not idealistic, and they would constantly invoke formulaic appeals to the grandeur of the "great Italian people," "endlessly summoned to emulate the greatness of its ancestors."
Substitute in the "great Chinese people" and it all sounds familiar. We are certainly not dealing with a Communist regime, either politically or economically, nor do Chinese leaders, even those who followed the radical reformer Deng Xiaoping, seem to be at all interested in treading the dangerous and uneven path from Stalinism to democracy. They know that Mikhail Gorbachev fell when he tried to control the economy while giving political freedom. They are attempting the opposite, keeping a firm grip on political power while permitting relatively free areas of economic enterprise. Their political methods are quite like those used by the European fascists 80 years ago.
The Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of China's long history.
Unlike traditional communist dictators--Mao, for example--who extirpated traditional culture and replaced it with a sterile Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of China's long history. Their passionate reassertion of the greatness of past dynasties has both entranced and baffled Western observers, because it does not fit the model of an "evolving communist system."
Yet the fascist leaders of the 1920s and 1930s used exactly the same device. Mussolini rebuilt Rome to provide a dramatic visual reminder of ancient glories, and he used ancient history to justify the conquest of Libya and Ethiopia. Hitler's favorite architect built neoclassical buildings throughout the Third Reich, and his favorite operatic composer organized festivals to celebrate the country's mythic past.
Like their European predecessors, the Chinese claim a major role in the world because of their history and culture, not just on the basis of their current power, or scientific or cultural accomplishments. China even toys with some of the more bizarre notions of the earlier fascisms, such as the program to make the country self-sufficient in wheat production--the same quest for autarky that obsessed both Hitler and Mussolini.
To be sure, the world is much changed since the first half of the last century. It's much harder (and sometimes impossible) to go it alone. Passions for total independence from the outside world are tempered by the realities of today's global economy, and China's appetite for oil and other raw materials is properly legendary. But the Chinese, like the European fascists, are intensely xenophobic, and obviously worry that their people may turn against them if they learn too much about the rest of the world. They consequently work very hard to dominate the flow of information. Just ask Google, forced to cooperate with the censors in order to work in China.
Some scholars of contemporary China see the Beijing regime as very nervous, and perhaps even unstable, and they are encouraged in this belief when they see recent events such as the eruption of popular sentiment against the Tibetan monks' modest protests. That view is further reinforced by similar outcries against most any criticism of Chinese performance, from human rights to air pollution, and from preparations for the Olympic Games to the failure of Chinese quality control in food production and children's toys. The recent treatment of French retailer Carrefour at the hands of Chinese nationalists is a case in point. It has been publicly excoriated and shunned because France's President Nicolas Sarkozy dared to consider the possibility of boycotting the Olympics.
In all these cases, it is tempting to conclude that the regime is worried about its own survival, and, in order to rally nationalist passions, feels compelled to portray the country as a global victim. Perhaps they are right. The strongest evidence to support the theory of insecurity at the highest levels of Chinese society is the practice of the "princelings" (wealthy children of the ruling elites) to buy homes in places such as the United States, Canada and Australia. These are not luxury homes of the sort favored by wealthy businessman and officials from the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Rather they are typically "normal" homes of the sort a potential 閙igr?might want to have in reserve in case things went bad back home.
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that eruptions of nationalist passion do indeed worry the regime, and Chinese leaders have certainly tamped down such episodes in the past. In recent days, the regime has even reached out to the Dalai Lama himself in an apparent effort to calm the situation, after previously enouncing the "Dalai clique" as a dangerous form of separatism and even treason.
The violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of the regime's popularity.
On the other hand, the cult of victimhood was always part of fascist culture. Just like Germany and Italy in the interwar period, China feels betrayed and humiliated, and seeks to avenge her many historic wounds. This is not necessarily a true sign of anxiety; it's an integral part of the sort of hypernationalism that has always been at the heart of all fascist movements and regimes. We cannot look into the souls of the Chinese tyrants, but I doubt that China is an intensely unstable system, riven by the democratic impulses of capitalism on the one hand, and the repressive practices of the regime on the other. This is a mature fascism, not a frenzied mass movement, and the current regime is not composed of revolutionary fanatics. Today's Chinese leaders are the heirs of two very different revolutions, Mao's and Deng's. The first was a failed communist experiment; the second is a fascist transformation whose future is up for grabs.
If the fascist model is correct, we should not be at all surprised by the recent rhetoric or mass demonstrations. Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy were every bit as sensitive to any sign of foreign criticism as the Chinese today, both because victimhood is always part of the definition of such states, and because it's an essential technique of mass control. The violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of the regime's popularity. Remember that European fascism did not fall as the result of internal crisis--it took a bloody world war to bring it down. Fascism was so alarmingly popular neither Italians not Germans produced more than token resistance until the war began to be lost. It may well be that the mass condemnation of Western calls for greater political tolerance is in fact a sign of political success.
Since classical fascism had such a brief life span, it is hard to know whether or not a stable, durable fascist state is possible. Economically, the corporate state, of which the current Chinese system is a textbook example, may prove more flexible and adaptable than the rigid central planning that doomed communism in the Soviet Empire and elsewhere (although the travails of Japan, which also tried to combine capitalist enterprise with government guidance, show the kinds of problems China will likely face). Our brief experience with fascism makes it difficult to evaluate the possibilities of political evolution, and the People's Republic is full of secrets. But prudent strategists would do well to assume that the regime will be around for a while longer--perhaps a lot longer.
If it is a popular, fascist regime, should the world prepare for some difficult and dangerous confrontations with the People's Republic? Twentieth-century fascist states were very aggressive; Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were both expansionist nations. Is it not likely that China will similarly seek to enlarge its domain?
I believe the answer is "yes, but." Many Chinese leaders might like to see their sway extend throughout the region, and beyond. China's military is not so subtly preparing the capability to defeat U.S. forces in Asia in order to prevent intervention in any conflict on its periphery. No serious student of China doubts the enormous ambitions of both the leadership and the masses. But, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, the Chinese tyrants do not urgently need quick geographical expansion to demonstrate the glory of their country and the truth of their vision. For the moment, at least, success at home and global recognition of Chinese accomplishments seem to be enough. Since Chinese fascism is less ideological than its European predecessors, Chinese leaders are far more flexible than Hitler and Mussolini.
Nonetheless, the short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West. That is built into the dna of all such regimes. Sooner or later, Chinese leaders will feel compelled to demonstrate the superiority of their system, and even the most impressive per capita GDP will not do. Superiority means others have to bend their knees, and cater to the wishes of the dominant nation. Just as Mussolini saw the colonization of Africa and the invasion of Greece and the Balkans as necessary steps in the establishment of a new fascist empire, so the Chinese are likely to demand tribute from their neighbors--above all, the Chinese on the island nation of Taiwan, in order to add the recovery of lost territory to the regime's list of accomplishments. Even today, at a time when the regime is seeking praise, not tribute, in the run-up to the Olympic Games, there are bellicose overtones to official rhetoric.
The short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West.
How, then, should the democracies deal with China? The first step is to disabuse ourselves of the notion that wealth is the surest guarantor of peace. The West traded with the Soviet Union, and gave them credits as well, but it did not prevent the Kremlin from expanding into the Horn of Africa, or sponsoring terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East. A wealthy China will not automatically be less inclined to go to war over Taiwan, or, for that matter, to wage or threaten war with Japan.
Indeed, the opposite may be true--the richer and stronger China becomes, the more they build up their military might, the more likely such wars may be. It follows that the West must prepare for war with China, hoping thereby to deter it. A great Roman once said that if you want peace, prepare for war. This is sound advice with regard to a fascist Chinese state that wants to play a global role.
Meanwhile, we should do what we can to convince the people of China that their long-term interests are best served by greater political freedom, no matter how annoying and chaotic that may sometimes be. I think we can trust the Chinese leaders on this one. Any regime as palpably concerned about the free flow of information, knows well that ideas about freedom might be very popular. Let's test that hypothesis, by talking directly to "the billion." In today's world, we can surely find ways to reach them.
If we do not take such steps, our risk will surely increase, and explosions of rage, manipulated or spontaneous, will recur. Eventually they will take the form of real actions.
(Michael A. Ledeen is the Freedom Scholar at AEI).
Posted: Tuesday, May 6, 2008
ARTICLES
Far Eastern Economic Review (May 2008)
Publication Date: May 1, 2008
In 2002, I speculated that China may be something we have never seen before: a mature fascist state. Recent events there, especially the mass rage in response to Western criticism, seem to confirm that theory. More significantly, over the intervening six years China's leaders have consolidated their hold on the organs of control--political, economic and cultural. Instead of gradually embracing pluralism as many expected, China's corporatist elite has become even more entrenched.
Even though they still call themselves communists, and the Communist Party rules the country, classical fascism should be the starting point for our efforts to understand the People's Republic. Imagine Italy 50 years after the fascist revolution. Mussolini would be dead and buried, the corporate state would be largely intact, the party would be firmly in control, and Italy would be governed by professional politicians, part of a corrupt elite, rather than the true believers who had marched on Rome. It would no longer be a system based on charisma, but would instead rest almost entirely on political repression, the leaders would be businesslike and cynical, not idealistic, and they would constantly invoke formulaic appeals to the grandeur of the "great Italian people," "endlessly summoned to emulate the greatness of its ancestors."
Substitute in the "great Chinese people" and it all sounds familiar. We are certainly not dealing with a Communist regime, either politically or economically, nor do Chinese leaders, even those who followed the radical reformer Deng Xiaoping, seem to be at all interested in treading the dangerous and uneven path from Stalinism to democracy. They know that Mikhail Gorbachev fell when he tried to control the economy while giving political freedom. They are attempting the opposite, keeping a firm grip on political power while permitting relatively free areas of economic enterprise. Their political methods are quite like those used by the European fascists 80 years ago.
The Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of China's long history.
Unlike traditional communist dictators--Mao, for example--who extirpated traditional culture and replaced it with a sterile Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of China's long history. Their passionate reassertion of the greatness of past dynasties has both entranced and baffled Western observers, because it does not fit the model of an "evolving communist system."
Yet the fascist leaders of the 1920s and 1930s used exactly the same device. Mussolini rebuilt Rome to provide a dramatic visual reminder of ancient glories, and he used ancient history to justify the conquest of Libya and Ethiopia. Hitler's favorite architect built neoclassical buildings throughout the Third Reich, and his favorite operatic composer organized festivals to celebrate the country's mythic past.
Like their European predecessors, the Chinese claim a major role in the world because of their history and culture, not just on the basis of their current power, or scientific or cultural accomplishments. China even toys with some of the more bizarre notions of the earlier fascisms, such as the program to make the country self-sufficient in wheat production--the same quest for autarky that obsessed both Hitler and Mussolini.
To be sure, the world is much changed since the first half of the last century. It's much harder (and sometimes impossible) to go it alone. Passions for total independence from the outside world are tempered by the realities of today's global economy, and China's appetite for oil and other raw materials is properly legendary. But the Chinese, like the European fascists, are intensely xenophobic, and obviously worry that their people may turn against them if they learn too much about the rest of the world. They consequently work very hard to dominate the flow of information. Just ask Google, forced to cooperate with the censors in order to work in China.
Some scholars of contemporary China see the Beijing regime as very nervous, and perhaps even unstable, and they are encouraged in this belief when they see recent events such as the eruption of popular sentiment against the Tibetan monks' modest protests. That view is further reinforced by similar outcries against most any criticism of Chinese performance, from human rights to air pollution, and from preparations for the Olympic Games to the failure of Chinese quality control in food production and children's toys. The recent treatment of French retailer Carrefour at the hands of Chinese nationalists is a case in point. It has been publicly excoriated and shunned because France's President Nicolas Sarkozy dared to consider the possibility of boycotting the Olympics.
In all these cases, it is tempting to conclude that the regime is worried about its own survival, and, in order to rally nationalist passions, feels compelled to portray the country as a global victim. Perhaps they are right. The strongest evidence to support the theory of insecurity at the highest levels of Chinese society is the practice of the "princelings" (wealthy children of the ruling elites) to buy homes in places such as the United States, Canada and Australia. These are not luxury homes of the sort favored by wealthy businessman and officials from the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Rather they are typically "normal" homes of the sort a potential 閙igr?might want to have in reserve in case things went bad back home.
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that eruptions of nationalist passion do indeed worry the regime, and Chinese leaders have certainly tamped down such episodes in the past. In recent days, the regime has even reached out to the Dalai Lama himself in an apparent effort to calm the situation, after previously enouncing the "Dalai clique" as a dangerous form of separatism and even treason.
The violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of the regime's popularity.
On the other hand, the cult of victimhood was always part of fascist culture. Just like Germany and Italy in the interwar period, China feels betrayed and humiliated, and seeks to avenge her many historic wounds. This is not necessarily a true sign of anxiety; it's an integral part of the sort of hypernationalism that has always been at the heart of all fascist movements and regimes. We cannot look into the souls of the Chinese tyrants, but I doubt that China is an intensely unstable system, riven by the democratic impulses of capitalism on the one hand, and the repressive practices of the regime on the other. This is a mature fascism, not a frenzied mass movement, and the current regime is not composed of revolutionary fanatics. Today's Chinese leaders are the heirs of two very different revolutions, Mao's and Deng's. The first was a failed communist experiment; the second is a fascist transformation whose future is up for grabs.
If the fascist model is correct, we should not be at all surprised by the recent rhetoric or mass demonstrations. Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy were every bit as sensitive to any sign of foreign criticism as the Chinese today, both because victimhood is always part of the definition of such states, and because it's an essential technique of mass control. The violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of the regime's popularity. Remember that European fascism did not fall as the result of internal crisis--it took a bloody world war to bring it down. Fascism was so alarmingly popular neither Italians not Germans produced more than token resistance until the war began to be lost. It may well be that the mass condemnation of Western calls for greater political tolerance is in fact a sign of political success.
Since classical fascism had such a brief life span, it is hard to know whether or not a stable, durable fascist state is possible. Economically, the corporate state, of which the current Chinese system is a textbook example, may prove more flexible and adaptable than the rigid central planning that doomed communism in the Soviet Empire and elsewhere (although the travails of Japan, which also tried to combine capitalist enterprise with government guidance, show the kinds of problems China will likely face). Our brief experience with fascism makes it difficult to evaluate the possibilities of political evolution, and the People's Republic is full of secrets. But prudent strategists would do well to assume that the regime will be around for a while longer--perhaps a lot longer.
If it is a popular, fascist regime, should the world prepare for some difficult and dangerous confrontations with the People's Republic? Twentieth-century fascist states were very aggressive; Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were both expansionist nations. Is it not likely that China will similarly seek to enlarge its domain?
I believe the answer is "yes, but." Many Chinese leaders might like to see their sway extend throughout the region, and beyond. China's military is not so subtly preparing the capability to defeat U.S. forces in Asia in order to prevent intervention in any conflict on its periphery. No serious student of China doubts the enormous ambitions of both the leadership and the masses. But, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, the Chinese tyrants do not urgently need quick geographical expansion to demonstrate the glory of their country and the truth of their vision. For the moment, at least, success at home and global recognition of Chinese accomplishments seem to be enough. Since Chinese fascism is less ideological than its European predecessors, Chinese leaders are far more flexible than Hitler and Mussolini.
Nonetheless, the short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West. That is built into the dna of all such regimes. Sooner or later, Chinese leaders will feel compelled to demonstrate the superiority of their system, and even the most impressive per capita GDP will not do. Superiority means others have to bend their knees, and cater to the wishes of the dominant nation. Just as Mussolini saw the colonization of Africa and the invasion of Greece and the Balkans as necessary steps in the establishment of a new fascist empire, so the Chinese are likely to demand tribute from their neighbors--above all, the Chinese on the island nation of Taiwan, in order to add the recovery of lost territory to the regime's list of accomplishments. Even today, at a time when the regime is seeking praise, not tribute, in the run-up to the Olympic Games, there are bellicose overtones to official rhetoric.
The short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West.
How, then, should the democracies deal with China? The first step is to disabuse ourselves of the notion that wealth is the surest guarantor of peace. The West traded with the Soviet Union, and gave them credits as well, but it did not prevent the Kremlin from expanding into the Horn of Africa, or sponsoring terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East. A wealthy China will not automatically be less inclined to go to war over Taiwan, or, for that matter, to wage or threaten war with Japan.
Indeed, the opposite may be true--the richer and stronger China becomes, the more they build up their military might, the more likely such wars may be. It follows that the West must prepare for war with China, hoping thereby to deter it. A great Roman once said that if you want peace, prepare for war. This is sound advice with regard to a fascist Chinese state that wants to play a global role.
Meanwhile, we should do what we can to convince the people of China that their long-term interests are best served by greater political freedom, no matter how annoying and chaotic that may sometimes be. I think we can trust the Chinese leaders on this one. Any regime as palpably concerned about the free flow of information, knows well that ideas about freedom might be very popular. Let's test that hypothesis, by talking directly to "the billion." In today's world, we can surely find ways to reach them.
If we do not take such steps, our risk will surely increase, and explosions of rage, manipulated or spontaneous, will recur. Eventually they will take the form of real actions.
(Michael A. Ledeen is the Freedom Scholar at AEI).
Bản dịch của BBC tiếng Việt:
Hồi năm 2002, tôi đã bình luận rằng Trung
Quốc có thể đang trở thành một quốc gia phát xít chín muồi, điều
mà chúng ta chưa từng được chứng kiến. Những sự kiện mới xảy ra tại
đây, nhất là làn sóng công phẫn trước sự chỉ trích của phương Tây,
dường như đang khẳng định chủ thuyết này.
Quan trọng hơn nữa, trong sáu năm qua, ban lãnh
đạo Trung Quốc đã củng cố kiểm soát vị thế của họ tại các cơ quan
đầu não trong các lĩnh vực chính trị, kinh tế và văn hóa. Thay vì
tiếp thu chủ nghĩa đa nguyên như nhiều người trông đợi, giới chóp bu
nước này lại càng trở nên bảo thủ giáo điều.
Tuy họ vẫn tự mệnh danh là 'người cộng
sản', để hiểu được nước Cộng hòa Nhân dân Trung Hoa chúng ta nên bắt
đầu bằng chủ nghĩa phát xít cổ điển.
Hãy hình dung nước Ý, 50 năm sau cuộc cách
mạng phát xít. Mussolini đã chết, thế nhưng nhà nước độc tài vẫn
cầm quyền. Hệ thống nước này nay dựa chủ yếu vào đàn áp chính
trị. Các nhà lãnh đạo không còn theo đuổi lý tưởng mà trở nên thực
tế và hoài nghi. Họ thường xuyên hô hào về sự vinh quang của "dân
tộc Ý vĩ đại" và kêu gọi noi gương tổ tiên.
Phương pháp chính trị
Nay thay vào những dòng trên cụm từ "dân
tộc Trung Quốc vĩ đại", ta sẽ thấy thật quen thuộc. Ban lãnh đạo
Trung Quốc hiện nay không còn chí thú theo đuổi con đường gập ghềnh
và nguy hiểm từ chủ nghĩa Stalin tới dân chủ nữa.
Họ hiểu rằng Mikhail Gorbachev đã thất bại
khi ông muốn kiểm soát nền kinh tế trong khi cho người dân quyền tự do
chính trị rộng lớn hơn.
Bởi vậy, họ muốn làm ngược lại: giữ chặt
quyền lực chính trị trong khi cho phép làm ăn kinh doanh một cách tương
đối tự do. Phương pháp chính trị của họ gần giống như những gì các
chế độ phát xít Âu châu từng làm nhiều năm trước.
Không giống như các lãnh đạo cộng sản truyền
thống, thí dụ Mao Trạch Đông, người muốn đào tận gốc văn hóa cổ
truyền để thay vào đó bằng chủ nghĩa Marxist Leninist; lãnh đạo Trung
Quốc thời nay hào hứng nhắc tới ánh hào quang của lịch sử lâu
đời.
Các thủ lĩnh phát xít thời những năm 1920
và 1930 hành xử đúng y như vậy. Mussolini tái thiết thành Rome để tạo
dựng lại sự huy hoàng của quá khứ cổ đại. Ông ta cũng lấy lịch sử
cổ đại ra để bao biện cho việc xâm chiếm Libya và Ethiopia.
Hitler cho kiến trúc sư của mình xây các tòa
nhà tân cổ điển trong suốt Đệ Tam Đế chế và bắt các nhà soạn nhạc
tổ chức lễ hội để ngợi ca quá khứ huyền thoại của dân tộc.
Cũng giống như những người tiền nhiệm châu
Âu, người Trung Quốc đòi vị trí quan trọng trên thế giới vì lịch sử
và văn hóa truyền thống, chứ không phải vì hiện trạng sức mạnh của
họ.
Thậm chí Trung Quốc còn thử nghiệm một số
ý tưởng lạ lùng vốn nảy sinh từ thời kỳ đầu của chủ nghĩa phát
xít, thí dụ chương trình tự cung tự cấp lúa mì mà cả Hitler và
Mussolini từng có thời theo đuổi.
Thời thế đổi thay
Tất nhiên thế giới đã thay đổi rất nhiều kể
từ đầu thế kỷ trước. Nay thật khó (và đôi lúc không thể) một mình
một chiếu. Thế nhưng Trung Quốc, cũng giống như các nước phát xít
châu Âu, đặc biệt lo sợ về ảnh hưởng của bên ngoài.
Họ sợ người dân sẽ quay lại chống chính phủ
nếu có được nhiều thông tin về thế giới bên ngoài. Bởi vậy mà chính
phủ cố sức kiểm soát nguồn thông tin vào trong nước.
Một số nhà nghiên cứu Trung Quốc nhận định
rằng chính quyền Bắc Kinh lo sợ, thậm chí bất an. Điều này được minh
chứng bằng phản ứng mạnh mẽ của Trung Quốc trước bất cứ chỉ trích
nào hướng về mình, từ nhân quyền tới ô nhiễm không khí, từ việc
chuẩn bị cho Olympics Bắc Kinh tới chất lượng hàng hóa xuất
khẩu.
Trong các trường hợp như vậy, dễ kết luận
rằng chính phủ Trung Quốc đang lo lắng về sự sống còn của mình và
để khuyếch trương các tình cảm dân tộc chủ nghĩa, họ phải quay sang
mô tả nước này như nạn nhân của quốc tế.
Sự 'nạn nhân hóa' bản thân cũng là một phần
trong văn hóa phát xít. Giống như Đức và Ý thời kỳ giữa các cuộc
thế chiến, Trung Quốc cảm thấy bị phản bội và sỉ nhục, nên tìm
cách trả thù cho các vết thương mà lịch sử gây ra.
Đây không nhất thiết là dấu hiệu bất an, mà
là một chỉ dấu cho dạng chủ nghĩa dân tộc quá khích vốn luôn là
trọng tâm của các phong trào và chính thể phát xít.
Chúng ta không thể nhìn vào tâm can các nhà
độc tài Trung Quốc nhưng tôi không nghĩ rằng nước này là một hệ
thống bất ổn bị chèn ép giữa sự thôi thúc của chủ nghĩa tư bản và
thái độ trấn áp của nhà cầm quyền.
Đây là chủ nghĩa phát xít đã vào độ chín
muồi, chứ không phải một phong trào quần chúng cuồng khích.
Thế giới cần làm gì?
Liệu thế giới có nên chuẩn bị cho khả năng
đối đầu khó khăn và nguy hiểm với nước Cộng hòa Nhân dân Trung Hoa hay
không?
Các quốc gia phát xít thế kỷ thứ 20 có đặc
điểm là rất hiếu chiến. Đức Quốc xã và phát xít Ý đều chủ trương
bành trướng. Vậy liệu Trung Quốc có đang tìm cách mở rộng lãnh thổ
của mình hay không?
Tôi tin rằng câu trả lời chính xác sẽ là:
"Đúng vậy, nhưng...".
Nhiều lãnh đạo của Trung Quốc có thể muốn
tầm kiểm soát của họ vượt qua phạm vi khu vực. Quân đội Trung Quốc
đang chuẩn bị sức mạnh để có thể đánh bật Hoa Kỳ tại Á châu nhằm
phòng ngừa Mỹ can thiệp vào các xung đột ngoại vi.
Tuy nhiên, không giống như Hitler hay Mussolini,
các lãnh đạo Trung Quốc chưa muốn mở rộng lãnh thổ địa lý một cách
nhanh chóng để thể hiện sự vĩ đại của đất nước và thực chất viễn
kiến của họ.
Tạm thời, thành công ở trong nước cùng sự
công nhận của quốc tế trước các thành tựu của Trung Quốc xem ra là
đủ. Chủ nghĩa phát xít Trung Quốc ít tính tư tưởng hơn phát xít châu
Âu và lãnh đạo Trung Quốc cũng mềm dẻo hơn Hitler hay Mussolini.
Thế nhưng, lịch sử ngắn ngủi của chủ nghĩa
phát xít cổ điển cho thấy rằng việc Trung Quốc tìm cách đối đầu
với phương Tây chỉ là vấn đề thời điểm. Điều đó đã nằm trong gien di
truyền của chính thể dạng này.
Sớm muộn nhà cầm quyền Trung Quốc cũng sẽ
cảm thấy nhu cầu phải thể hiện sự vượt trội của hệ thống, và ngay
cả các thống kê đáng nể nhất về thu nhập quốc dân cũng sẽ không
đủ.
Sự vượt trội có nghĩa là các nước khác
phải quỳ gối, phải cung phụng quốc gia thống trị. Giống như Mussolini
nhìn việc thuộc địa hóa châu Phi, xâm chiếm Hy Lạp và vùng Balkan như
các bước đi cần thiết để thiết lập một đế chế phát xít; Trung Quốc
rồi cũng sẽ đòi các nước láng giềng, trước hết là người Hoa trên
hòn đảo Đài Loan, phải thuần phục để bổ sung việc lấy lại các lãnh
thổ bị mất vào danh sách các thành tựu của chế độ.
Các nền dân chủ trên thế giới sẽ phải hành
xử thế nào?
đầu tiên cần phải xóa đi quan niệm rằng của
cải có thể bảo đảm hòa bình. Không chắc một nước Trung Quốc giàu
có sẽ giảm ý muốn gây chiến với Đài Loan hay dọa dẫm Nhật
Bản.
Sự thực có thể là ngược lại: Trung Quốc
càng giàu có, quân đội của họ càng mạnh thì khả năng chiến tranh là
càng lớn.
Phương Tây cần chuẩn bị cho chiến tranh với
Trung Quốc với hy vọng tránh được điều này.
Trong khi đó, chúng ta cần làm những gì có
thể để thuyết phục người dân Trung Quốc rằng tự do chính trị càng
lớn thì quyền lợi lâu dài của họ càng được bảo đảm, cho dù nhiều
khi có thể khó chịu và lộn xộn.
Nếu chúng ta không làm những việc đó, nguy cơ
chắc chắn sẽ tăng lên và các vụ bùng nổ giận dữ dù vô tình hay cố
ý của Trung Quốc sẽ còn lặp lại. Dần dần, chúng sẽ biến thành
hành động.
(Michael A. Ledeen hiện là chuyên gia về chính
sách đối ngoại Hoa Kỳ tại Viện Nghiên cứu American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research).
